


The Global Justice Platform



Interpretation. The key element of the Global Justice Platform is the Global Justice Fund, which collects revenues from a global wealth tax and a global income tax, which are then invested and yield returns through a World Sovereign Fund, an active portfolio of sustainable assets. The Global Justice Fund distributes country dividends to finance massive investments in climate, infrastructure, education and health.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE0)

Global Justice Fund: Revenues and Expenses, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% world GDP)	GJF Annual Revenues	Incl. Global Wealth Tax Revenue	Incl. Global Income Tax Revenue	Incl. Investment Income from the World Sovereign Fund	GJF Annual Expenses	Incl. GJF Country Dividends	Incl. Investment Flows into the World Sovereign Fund
2026-2035	14.1%	6.8%	4.0%	3.3%	14.1%	5.8%	8.4%
2036-2060	8.7%	1.6%	1.6%	5.5%	8.7%	5.7%	3.0%
2061-2100	5.3%	0.1%	0.4%	4.8%	5.3%	2.8%	2.6%
2026-2100	7.6%	1.5%	1.3%	4.8%	7.6%	4.1%	3.5%

Interpretation. GJF projected revenues and expenses amount to 7.7% of world GDP per year on average over the 2026-2100 period, including 14.1% in the early period (2026-2035), 8.8% in the middle period (2036-2060) and 5.5% in the late period (2061-2100). Wealth tax revenues play a critical role in the early period and are later replaced by investment income from the World Sovereign Fund. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE1)

Global Justice Fund: Country Dividends, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% regional GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	5.8%	2.5%	2.1%	7.0%	6.5%	23.1%	4.9%	5.2%	10.4%
2036-2060	5.7%	2.7%	2.4%	6.4%	6.2%	11.4%	5.0%	5.8%	7.2%
2061-2100	2.8%	2.1%	2.0%	2.9%	2.8%	3.2%	2.6%	2.8%	2.8%
2026-2100	4.1%	2.4%	2.1%	4.6%	4.4%	8.6%	3.7%	4.1%	5.3%

Interpretation. GJF country dividends are used to finance climate investment and education and health expenditure and are allocated to each country on an equal per capita basis. This explains why they represent a smaller fraction of GDP in rich regions (2.1% of GDP in North America/Oceania on average over the 2026-2100 period) than in poor regions (8.6% of GDP in Subsaharan Africa), with a large gap in the early period and a smaller gap at the end period (thanks to global convergence). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE2a)

Global Justice Fund: Country Dividends, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% world GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	5.8%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.9%	0.2%	1.2%	1.7%
2036-2060	5.7%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	1.1%	0.2%	0.9%	1.8%
2061-2100	2.8%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0.3%	0.9%
2026-2100	4.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.9%	0.1%	0.6%	1.3%

Interpretation. GJF country dividends are used to finance climate investment and education and health expenditure and are allocated to each country on an equal per capita basis. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE2aw)

Global Justice Fund: Global Wealth & Income Tax Payments, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% regional GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	10.8%	8.4%	15.7%	7.2%	10.4%	3.4%	13.3%	10.5%	9.8%
2036-2060	3.2%	2.9%	5.2%	2.4%	3.5%	1.4%	3.7%	3.0%	3.1%
2061-2100	0.5%	0.3%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%
2026-2100	2.8%	2.3%	4.2%	2.0%	2.9%	1.1%	3.3%	2.6%	2.7%

Interpretation. The Global Justice Fund receives global wealth and income tax payments from all world regions, with particularly large payments with high average income or wealth and/or high income or wealth inequality. Tax revenues quickly decline over time due to the compression of income and wealth distributions. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE2b)

Global Justice Fund: Global Wealth & Income Tax Payments, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% world GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	10.8%	1.6%	3.7%	0.5%	0.7%	0.1%	0.5%	2.4%	1.4%
2036-2060	3.2%	0.4%	0.8%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.8%
2061-2100	0.5%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
2026-2100	2.8%	0.4%	0.8%	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.6%

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE2bw)

Global Justice Fund: Global Wealth Tax Payments, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% regional GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	6.8%	6.1%	10.3%	3.1%	4.4%	1.7%	6.4%	7.4%	5.0%
2036-2060	1.6%	1.8%	2.7%	0.9%	1.6%	0.6%	1.5%	1.9%	1.2%
2061-2100	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
2026-2100	1.5%	1.4%	2.3%	0.7%	1.2%	0.5%	1.4%	1.6%	1.1%

Interpretation. The Global Justice Fund receives global wealth tax payments from all world regions, with particularly large payments from regions with high average wealth and/or high wealth inequality. Tax revenues quickly decline over time due to the compression of wealth distributions. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE2c)

Global Justice Fund: Global Wealth Tax Payments, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% world GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	6.8%	1.2%	2.5%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.2%	1.7%	0.7%
2036-2060	1.6%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%
2061-2100	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
2026-2100	1.5%	0.2%	0.5%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE2cw)

Global Justice Fund: Global Income Tax Payments, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% regional GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	4.0%	2.3%	5.4%	4.1%	5.9%	1.7%	6.9%	3.1%	4.7%
2036-2060	1.6%	1.2%	2.5%	1.5%	2.0%	0.8%	2.2%	1.1%	1.9%
2061-2100	0.4%	0.3%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	0.2%	0.5%	0.3%	0.6%
2026-2100	1.3%	0.8%	1.8%	1.2%	1.7%	0.6%	1.9%	0.9%	1.6%

Interpretation. The Global Justice Fund receives global income tax payments from all world regions, with particularly large payments from regions with high average income and/or high income inequality. Tax revenues quickly decline over time due to the compression of income distributions. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE2d)

Global Justice Fund: Global Income Tax Payments, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% world GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	4.0%	0.4%	1.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.2%	0.7%	0.7%
2036-2060	1.6%	0.2%	0.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.5%
2061-2100	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
2026-2100	1.3%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE2dw)

Global Justice Fund: Implicit Country Transfers, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% regional GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	0.0%	-0.9%	-8.6%	4.8%	1.2%	24.7%	-3.3%	-0.2%	5.6%
2036-2060	0.0%	-2.7%	-5.3%	1.6%	0.2%	7.6%	-1.2%	0.4%	1.7%
2061-2100	0.0%	-0.5%	-0.9%	0.2%	0.0%	0.6%	-0.2%	0.2%	-0.2%
2026-2100	0.0%	-1.3%	-3.4%	1.3%	0.2%	6.1%	-1.0%	0.2%	1.2%

Interpretation. Implicit country transfers represent the gap between country dividends received (relative to world average country dividends received as a proportion of GDP) and global taxes paid (relative to world average global taxes paid as a proportion of GDP).

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE2e)

Global Justice Fund: Implicit Country Transfers, 2026-2100

Annual averages (% world GDP)	World	Europe	North America Oceania	Latin America	Middle East North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	Russia Central Asia	East Asia	South & South-East Asia
2026-2035	0.0%	-0.1%	-1.9%	0.3%	0.1%	1.0%	-0.1%	-0.1%	0.9%
2036-2060	0.0%	-0.4%	-0.8%	0.1%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%
2061-2100	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.1%
2026-2100	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.6%	0.1%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%

Interpretation. Implicit country transfers represent the gap between country dividends received (relative to world average country dividends received as a proportion of GDP) and global taxes paid (relative to world average global taxes paid as a proportion of GDP).

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE2ew)

World Sovereign Fund: Assets, Debt and Leverage				
Annual averages (% world GDP)	Total WSF Investment Income	Counterfactual WSF Investment Income Without Leverage Effect	Extra WSF Investment Income Due to Leverage Effect	<i>Share of Total WSF Investment Income Due to Leverage Effect</i>
2026-2035	3.3%	3.1%	0.2%	7%
2036-2060	5.5%	4.6%	0.9%	17%
2061-2100	4.8%	3.9%	0.9%	19%
2026-2100	4.8%	4.0%	0.8%	17%
Interpretation. The World Sovereign Fund is projected to generate total investment income around 4.8% of world GDP on average over the 2026-2100 period, including 4.0% without the leverage effect due to public debt and 0.8% due to the leverage effect (i.e. 17% of total WSF investment income). Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (TE3)				

Global Justice Fund: Progressive Rates Used for the the Global Wealth Tax, 2026-2100

Multiple of average world wealth	Wealth level (2026) (per adult net wealth in 2025 Euros)	Annual wealth tax (effective tax rate)
0	0	0.0%
1	110 600	0.0%
10	1 106 000	0.0%
20	2 212 000	1.0%
50	5 530 000	3.0%
100	11 060 000	5.0%
500	55 300 000	10.0%
1 000	110 600 000	15.0%
5 000	553 000 000	20.0%

Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the effective global wealth tax rate rises gradually from 0% at the level of 10 times average world wealth to 1% at the level of 20 times average wealth, 3% at 50 times, etc., and 20% above 5000 times average wealth (i.e. 552 millions € in per adult wealth in 2026). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE4).

Global Justice Fund: Progressive Rates Used for the Global Wealth Tax, 2026-2100

Multiple of average world wealth	Wealth level (2026) (2025 €) (per adult net wealth)	Annual wealth tax (effective tax rate)	Number of adult individuals (millions)	% World adult population	Total wealth (trillions 2025 €)	% World GDP	Total wealth tax revenue (trillions 2025 €)	% World GDP
0	0	0.0%	4 721	84.3%	100.5	71%	0.0	0.0%
1	110 600	0.0%	697	12.4%	161.3	114%	0.0	0.0%
5	553 000	0.0%	79	1.4%	54.8	39%	0.0	0.0%
8	884 800	0.0%	29	0.5%	28.5	20%	0.0	0.0%
10	1 106 000	0.0%	25	0.4%	30.9	22%	0.0	0.0%
12	1 327 200	0.2%	15	0.3%	22.3	16%	0.1	0.1%
15	1 659 000	0.5%	13	0.2%	23.8	17%	0.2	0.1%
20	2 212 000	1.0%	19	0.3%	60.4	43%	1.0	0.7%
50	5 530 000	3.0%	3.701	0.07%	27.9	20%	1.1	0.8%
100	11 060 000	5.0%	1.015	0.02%	15.3	11%	0.9	0.7%
200	22 120 000	8.0%	0.525	0.01%	16.3	12%	1.4	1.0%
500	55 300 000	10.0%	0.146	0.003%	10.6	7%	1.3	0.9%
1 000	110 600 000	15.0%	0.072	0.001%	15.2	11%	2.5	1.8%
5 000	553 000 000	20.0%	0.029	0.001%	29.9	21%	6.0	4.2%
			5 604	100%	597.7	423%	14.5	10.3%

Interpretation. In 2026, about 4.7 billion individuals (84.3% of the world adult population) have per adult wealth below world average wealth (110k €) in 2026, while 29 000 individuals (less than 0.001%) own more than 552 millions € (5000 times world average). Their total wealth amounts to 29.9 trillions €, i.e. 21% of world GDP. In our benchmark "global justice" scenario, they will pay 6.0 trillion € in global wealth tax, i.e. 4.2% of world GDP, out of total wealth revenues equal to 10.3% of world GDP. **Note.** World GDP is projected to be 141 trillions€ in 2026. All amounts are expressed in 2025 PPP €. **Sources:** gjp.wid.world (TE4f)

Global Wealth Tax: Simulations for 2026

Multiple of average world wealth	Wealth level (per adult net wealth in 2025 Euros)	Annual wealth tax (effective tax rate)	Number of adult individuals (millions)	% World adult population	Total wealth (trillions Euros)	% World GDP	Total wealth tax revenue (trillions Euros)	% World GDP
0	0	0.0%	4 721	84.3%	100.5	71%	0.0	0.0%
1	110 600	0.0%	805	14.4%	244.6	173%	0.0	0.0%
10	1 106 000	0.0%	52	0.9%	77.0	54%	0.3	0.2%
20	2 212 000	1.0%	19	0.3%	60.4	43%	1.0	0.7%
50	5 530 000	3.0%	5.241	0.1%	59.5	42%	3.4	2.4%
500	55 300 000	10.0%	0.217	0.004%	25.8	18%	3.8	2.7%
5 000	553 000 000	20.0%	0.029	0.001%	29.9	21%	6.0	4.2%
			5 604	100%	597.7	423%	14.5	10.3%

Interpretation. In 2026, about 4.7 billion individuals (84.3% of the world adult population) own wealth below world average wealth (110k €), and about 29 000 individuals (less than 0.001%) own more than 552 millions € (5000 times world average). Their total wealth is 29.9 trillions €, i.e. 21% of world GDP. In our benchmark scenario, they pay 6.0 trillion € in global wealth tax, i.e. 4.2% of world GDP, out of total wealth tax revenues equal to 10.3% of world GDP. In terms of potential tax base and tax revenue, billionaires do matter, but less so than decamillionnaires and centimillionnaires. **Note.** World GDP is projected to be 141 trillions € in 2026. All amounts are in 2025 PPP €. **Sources:** gjp.wid.world (TE4x)

Global Justice Fund: Progressive Rates Used for the the Global Income Tax, 2026-2100

Multiple of average world income	Income level (2026) (per adult disposable income in 2025 Euros)	Annual income tax (effective tax rate)
0	0	0.0%
1	21 300	0.0%
7	149 100	0.0%
10	213 000	5.0%
20	426 000	20.0%
50	1 065 000	40.0%
100	2 130 000	50.0%
500	10 650 000	70.0%
1 000	21 300 000	80.0%
5 000	106 500 000	90.0%

Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the effective global income tax rate rises gradually from 0% at the level of 7 times average world income to 5% at the level of 10 times average income, 20% at 20 times, etc., and 90% above 5000 times average income (i.e. 106 millions € in per adult disposable income in 2026). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (TE5).

Global Justice Fund: Progressive Rates Used for the Global Income Tax, 2026-2100

Multiple of average world Income	Income level (2026) (2025 €) (per adult disposable income)	Annual Income tax (effective tax rate)	Number of adult individuals (millions)	% World adult population	Total Income (trillions 2025 €)	% World GDP	Total Income tax revenue (trillions 2025 €)	% World GDP
0	0	0.0%	4 091	73.0%	28.0	20%	0.0	0.0%
1	21 300	0.0%	1 382	24.7%	61.2	43%	0.0	0.0%
5	106 500	0.0%	68	1.2%	8.5	6.0%	0.0	0.0%
7	149 100	0.0%	30	0.5%	5.3	3.7%	0.1	0.1%
10	213 000	5.0%	10	0.2%	2.4	1.7%	0.2	0.1%
12	255 600	10.0%	8	0.1%	2.4	1.7%	0.3	0.2%
15	319 500	15.0%	5	0.1%	1.8	1.3%	0.3	0.2%
20	426 000	20.0%	7	0.1%	4.5	3.2%	1.2	0.9%
50	1 065 000	40.0%	1.452	0.03%	2.0	1.4%	0.9	0.6%
100	2 130 000	50.0%	0.370	0.01%	1.1	0.8%	0.6	0.4%
200	4 260 000	60.0%	0.153	0.00%	1.0	0.7%	0.6	0.4%
500	10 650 000	70.0%	0.020	0.000%	0.3	0.2%	0.2	0.2%
1 000	21 300 000	80.0%	0.037	0.001%	1.8	1.3%	1.5	1.1%
5 000	106 500 000	90.0%	0.004	0.000%	0.5	0.3%	0.4	0.3%
			5 604	100%	120.7	85%	6.4	4.5%

Interpretation. In 2026, about 4.1 billion individuals (72.9% of the world adult population) have disposable income below world average disposable income (21k €), and about 40 000 individuals (less than 0.001%) have more than 1000 times average income (21 million Euros). Their total income is 2.2 trillions €, i.e. 1.6% of world GDP. In our benchmark scenario, they pay 1.9 trillion € in global income tax, i.e. 1.3% of world GDP, out of total income tax revenues equal to 4.5% of world GDP. In terms of potential tax base and tax revenue, taxpayers with several dozen millions Euros in income do matter, but they matter less than those with several hundred thousands or several millions. **Sources:** gjp.wid.world (TE5f)


Global Income Tax: Simulations for 2026

Multiple of average world Income	Income level (2026) (2025 €) (per adult disposable income)	Annual Income tax (effective tax rate)	Number of adult individuals (millions)	% World adult population	Total Income (trillions 2025 €)	% World GDP	Total Income tax revenue (trillions 2025 €)	% World GDP
0	0	0.0%	4 091	73.0%	28.0	20%	0.0	0.0%
1	21 300	0.0%	1 450	25.9%	69.7	49%	0.0	0.0%
7	149 100	0.0%	30	0.5%	5.3	3.7%	0.1	0.1%
10	213 000	5.0%	23	0.4%	6.6	4.7%	0.8	0.6%
20	426 000	20.0%	7.293	0.130%	4.5	3.2%	1.2	0.9%
50	1 065 000	40.0%	1.452	0.026%	2.0	1.4%	0.9	0.6%
100	2 130 000	50.0%	0.543	0.010%	2.3	1.6%	1.4	1.0%
1 000	21 300 000	80.0%	0.041	0.001%	2.3	1.6%	1.9	1.4%
			5 604	100%	120.7	85%	6.4	4.5%

Interpretation. In 2026, about 4.1 billion individuals (72.9% of the world adult population) have disposable income below world average disposable income (21k €), and about 40 000 individuals (less than 0.001%) have more than 1000 times average income (21 million Euros). Their total income is 2.2 trillions €, i.e. 1.6% of world GDP. In our benchmark scenario, they pay 1.9 trillion € in global income tax, i.e. 1.3% of world GDP, out of total income tax revenues equal to 4.5% of world GDP. In terms of potential tax base and tax revenue, taxpayers with several dozen millions Euros in income do matter, but they matter less than those with several hundred thousands or several millions. **Sources:** gjp.wid.world (TE5x)


Global Justice: Equality & Prosperity for all Countries by 2100

(Monthly Gross National Disposable Income, 2025 Euros PPP)




Interpretation. The Global Justice Platform aims to combine equality and prosperity for all countries with planetary habitability (global warming below 2°C). This requires major structural transformation: large work hours reduction, shift from material to immaterial sectors (education/health/culture), change in food habits & reforestation, decarbonization of production, inequality compression. **Sources & series:** gjp.wid.world (A0a)

Global Justice and Sustainable Convergence: 60k€ for All in 2100 with Structural Transformation




Interpretation. In the "sustainable convergence" scenario, all countries reach per capita GDP around 60k€ PPP 2025 by 2100. We find that this 60k target is compatible with planetary limits only under major structural transformation: drastic reduction in labour hours, major shift from material to immaterial sectors, change in food habits, decarbonization of production, inequality compression. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (A0b)

Net foreign income 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A1)

Net foreign capital income 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A2)

Net foreign labor income 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A3)

Net foreign subsidies/taxes 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A4)

Gross National Income 1970-2100 (% GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A5)

Net foreign transfers 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A6)

Net private transfers (remittances) 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A7)

Net public transfers (non GJF) 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A8)

Net other foreign transfers 1970-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A9)

Net GJF transfers 2020-2100 (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A10)

Net GJF transfers 2020-2100 (% world GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A10w)

Gross National Disposable Income (% GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (A11)

Global Justice: An International Clearing Union to End Global Imbalances (Net Foreign Wealth, % World GDP)




Interpretation. The Global Justice Platform includes an International Clearing Union in order to end global imbalances. It is similar in spirit to Keynes 1943/Stiglitz 2010 ICU proposals (including penalties for excessive current account surpluses and deficits), except that it is embedded into a broader framework including adequate funding for global socioeconomic convergence. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (B1w)

Global Justice: An International Clearing Union to End Global Imbalances (Net Current Account, % World GDP)




Interpretation. The Global Justice Platform includes an International Clearing Union in order to end global imbalances. It is similar in spirit to Keynes 1943/Stiglitz 2010 ICU proposals (including penalties for excessive current account surpluses and deficits), except that it is embedded into a broader framework including adequate funding for global socioeconomic convergence. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (B2w)

Global Justice: An International Clearing Union to End Global Imbalances (Net Trade Balance, % of World GDP)




Interpretation. The Global Justice Platform includes an International Clearing Union aiming for quasi-balanced current accounts for all countries by 2035, implying very large trade surpluses for the US by 2035. Alternative scenarios are possible, including a later date for current account balance and smoother projected trends for trade surpluses and deficits. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (B3w)

Gross foreign assets (% regional GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (B4a)

Gross foreign liabilities (% regional GDP)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (B4b)


Global Justice: A World Sovereign Fund to Reorient Investment (World Capital Stock, % world GDP)



Interpretation. The World Sovereign Fund is set to stabilize its assets at about 60% of world GDP over the 2030-2100 period, i.e. about 10% of the world capital stock. Initial WGSF accumulation in 2026-2035 is made possible by reinvesting a large part of global tax revenue, especially the global wealth tax on very top wealth holders (billionaires and centimillionaires). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (C0a)


Global Justice: Towards a Mixed Property Structure

(World Capital Stock, % world GDP)




Interpretation. The World Sovereign Fund is set to stabilize its assets at about 60% of world GDP over the 2030-2100 period, i.e. about 10% of the world capital stock. Initial WSF accumulation in 2026-2035 is made possible by reinvesting a large part of global tax revenue, especially the global wealth tax on very top wealth holders (billionaires and centimillionaires). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (C0b)

Global Justice: Towards a Mixed Property Structure (Public Wealth, % National Wealth)




Interpretation. The World Sovereign Fund is set to stabilize its assets at about 60% of world GDP over the 2030-2100 period, i.e. about 10% of the world capital stock. Initial WSF accumulation in 2026-2035 is made possible by reinvesting a large part of global tax revenue. Total public wealth (including non-WSF public wealth) is projected to rise to 30% of the world capital stock by 2100, which is slightly higher than the share of public wealth in 1970. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (C1a)

Global Justice: Towards a Mixed Property Structure (Public Wealth, % National Wealth)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (C1b)


Global Justice: Public Assets and Debt (% world GDP)



Interpretation. Net public wealth (excl. World Sovereign Fund) dropped from 83% of world GDP in 1970 (128% in public assets and 45% in public debt) to 67% in 2025 (176% in assets and 109% in debt); it is projected to rise 120% of world GDP by 2100 (180% in assets and 60% in debt). WSF net wealth is projected to rise from 0% of world GDP in 2025 to 60% of world GDP in 2100 (90% of assets and 30% in debt).


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (C2)

Public Wealth (excl. WSF) (% GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (C3a)

Public Assets (excl. WSF) (% GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (C3b)

Public Debt (excl. WSF) (% GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (C3c)

Global Justice: A More Balanced Distribution of Power between Capitalists & Workers (Gross Capital Share, % GDP)




Interpretation. The gross capital share rose from 38% to 46% of GDP at the world level between 1970 and 2025. According to the Global Justice Platform, it is projected to decline to 36% of GDP in all world regions by 2100. **Note.** The gross capital share includes all business profits and housing rents (before deduction of consumption of fixed capital). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (D2a)

Global Justice: A More Balanced Distribution of Power between Capitalists and Workers (Net Capital Share, % NDP)



Interpretation. The net capital share rose from 28% to 34% of NDP at the world level between 1970 and 2025. According to the Global Justice Platform, it is projected to decline to 24% of NDP in all world regions by 2100. **Note.** The net capital share includes all business profits and housing rents, after deduction of consumption of fixed capital (CFC). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (D2b)


Global Justice: A More Balanced Distribution of Power between Capitalists & Workets (Gross Return to Capital)



Interpretation. The gross rate of return on domestic capital (i.e. the gross capital share divided by the domestic capital stock) is projected to decline from 8.9% on average at the world level in 2025 to 6.0% in all world regions by 2100.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (D3a)

Global Justice: A More Balanced Distribution of Power between Capitalists & Workers (Net Return to Capital)




Interpretation. The net rate of return on domestic capital (i.e. net gross capital share divided by the domestic capital stock) is projected to decline from 5.4% on average at the world level in 2025 to 3.4% in all world regions by 2100.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (D3b)


Global Justice: The End of Exorbitant Privilege

(Differential between return on foreign assets vs foreign liabilities)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (D4a)

Global Justice: The End of Exorbitant Privilege (Excess Yield on Foreign Wealth, % regional GDP)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (D4b)


Global Justice: The End of Exorbitant Privilege (Excess Yield on Foreign Wealth, % World GDP)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (D4bw)


Global Justice: the End of Exorbitant Privilege

(Average effective interest rate on public debt)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (D4c)

A New International Monetary System: Stability & Purchasing Power Parity (Real Exchange Rates 1970-2100)




Interpretation. Over the 1970-2025 period, we observe sharp fluctuations in real exchange rates, which are generally far below 1 for the poorest regions (i.e. their market exchange rate is below purchasing power parity). Under the Global Justice Platform, the new international monetary system envisioned for the future is based upon the principles of stability and purchasing power parity. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (D5)

Global Justice Fund (GJF): Projected Annual Revenues 2026-2100 (% world GDP)




Interpretation. GJF revenues come from a global wealth tax, a global income tax & gross investment income from the World Sovereign Fund (WSF) (accumulated thanks to previous tax revenues). Wealth tax revenues play a key role in 2026-2035 to build up WSF, but later become less important than investment income. In 2050, total GJF revenues make 7.7% of world GDP, including 1.0% in wealth tax revenue, 0.9% in income tax revenue and 5.8% in investment income. By 2100, all revenues come from investment income. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E1a)

Global Justice Fund (GJF): Projected Annual Expenses 2026-2100 (% world GDP)




Interpretation. GJF expenses consist of country dividends (allocated to each country on an equal per-capita basis and used to finance climate investment and education and health expenditure) and gross investment flows accumulating into the World Sovereign Fund (WSF). Investment flows play a very important role in 2026-2035 in order to build up the WSF. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E1b)

The Global Justice Fund: Comparison with Existing Development Aid and Other Institutions (% World GDP)




Interpretation. GJF expenditures make 10.3% of world GDP per year on average over 2026-2060. GJF expenses consist of country dividends (allocated to each country on an equal per-capita basis) and gross investment flows accumulating into the World Sovereign Fund (WSF). This vastly exceeds total development aid (ODA, 0.3% of world GDP in 2025) or the combined budget of UN, IMF and WB (0.1% of world GDP in 2025) (including all annual disbursements: regular expenditures, loans, subsidies, etc.). **Sources & series:** gjp.wid.world (E1c)

Global Justice Fund: Country Dividends 2026-2100 (% world GDP)




Interpretation. Country dividends are allocated to each country on an equal per-capita basis and are used to finance climate investment and education and health expenditure. They represent about 5-8% of world GDP on average over the 2030-2050 period (down to 2-4% of world GDP over the 2060-2100 period), with the same geographical distribution as the world population. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E2a)

Global Justice Fund: Country Dividends 2026-2100 (% regional GDP)




Interpretation. Country dividends are allocated to each country on an equal per-capita basis and are used to finance climate investment and education and health expenditure. They represent about 5-8% of world GDP on average over the 2030-2050 period (up to 15-35% of GDP in South & Southeast Asia and Subsaharan Africa in peak years) and 2-3% of world GDP over 2060-2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E2b)

Global Justice Fund (GJF): Financing Sustainable Convergence via Country Dividends 2026-2100 (% world GDP)



Interpretation. Country dividends are allocated to each country on an equal per-capita basis and are used to finance climate investment and education and health expenditure. They represent about 5-8% of world GDP on average over the 2030-2050, with the same geographical distribution as the world population. The split of country dividends into climate investments, health expenditures and education expenditures is illustrative and to be decided by each country themselves. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E2c)


The Long March Toward Global Justice: Per Capita Country Dividends 2026-2100 (2025 Euro PPP)



Interpretation. Country dividends are allocated to each country on an equal per-capita basis. They represent about 5-8% of world GDP on average over the 2030-2050, corresponding to 1900€ per person in 2035 (approximately 420€ for education, 630€ for health, 850€ for climate) and about 1200€ per person per year over the period from 2050-2100. These are significant amounts which can help jumpstart the process of global sustainable convergence, but they are too small to equalize access to education and health countries in the coming decades.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (E2d)


Sustainable Convergence Scenario: Total Additional Financing Needs 2026-2100 (% world GDP)



Interpretation. According to our projections, the sustainable convergence scenario requires total additional financing for capital investment, human capital expenditure and reforestation fund around 12% of world GDP by 2050. Country dividends provided by the Global Justice Fund can cover a substantial part of the needs in the early period (2026-2050), but in the longer run domestic funding will have to play the larger role.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (E2e)


Global Wealth Tax Taxpayers 2026-2100 (% world population)



Interpretation. About 1.2-1.5% of the world population is subject to the global wealth tax over the 2026-2050 period (mostly coming from the world's richest countries), and less than 0.5% of the world population after 2060 (with a more balanced regional distribution).

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (E3a)


Global Wealth Tax Taxpayers 2026-2100 (% regional population)



Interpretation. About 1-1.5% of the world population is subject to the global wealth tax over the 2026-2060 period (with large variations across regions: up to 4-7% in rich regions, less than 1% in poor regions), and less than 0.5% everywhere after 2060-2070.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (E3b)

Global Wealth Tax Revenues 2026-2100 (% world GDP)




Interpretation. Global wealth tax revenues are projected to be high early on (around 8% of world GDP on average in 2026-2030) and to decline gradually (1-2% of world GDP in 2040-2060). Projected revenues are particularly high in North America/Oceania early on (due to a combination of high average wealth and large wealth concentration) and other rich regions (Europe, East Asia). They gradually become more important in Subsaharan Africa and South & Southeast Asia by 2050-2060. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E3c)

Global Wealth Tax Revenues 2026-2100 (% regional GDP)




Interpretation. Global wealth tax revenues are projected to be high early on (around 8% of world GDP on average in 2026-2030) and to decline gradually (1-2% of world GDP in 2040-2060). Projected revenues are particularly high in North America/Oceania early on, due to a combination of high average wealth and large wealth concentration. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E3d)

Millionaires Matter More than Billionaires (Cumulated Wealth Tax Revenues 2026-2035, % World GDP)




Interpretation. The global wealth tax is projected to raise total revenue of 64.2% of world GDP over the 2026-2035 period. Individuals with more than 5000 times average world wealth (approximately the billionaires) are projected to pay a significant share (10.9% of world GDP), but not enough to raise the amounts required for the GJF. Together, millionaires (10-50x average wealth), decamillionaires (50-100x average wealth) and centimillionaires (500-5000x average wealth) are projected to pay five times more than billionaires. **Sources & series:** gjp.wid.world (E3e)

Global Wealth Tax Revenues 2026-2100 (% world GDP)



Interpretation. Global wealth tax revenues are projected to be very large early on (around 8% of world GDP on average in 2026-2030) and to decline gradually (1-2% of world GDP in 2040-2060). In the first years a large part of this is paid by the group of billionaires (owning more than 5000x average wealth). However, due to the large tax rates and the compression of wealth inequality the number of billionaires (and later centimillionaires and decamillionaires) reduces fast and so do their taxes paid. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E3f)


Global Income Tax Taxpayers 2026-2100 (% world population)



Interpretation. About 1-1.1% of the world population is subject to the global income tax over the 2026-2050 period (mostly coming from the world's richest regions), and less than 0.5% of the world population after 2060 (with a more balanced regional distribution).

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (E4a)


Global Income Tax Taxpayers 2026-2100 (% regional population)



Interpretation. About 1-1.5% of the world population is subject to the global wealth tax over the 2026-2060 period (with large variations across regions: up to 3-6% in rich regions, less than 1% in poor regions), and less than 1% everywhere after 2060-2070.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (E4b)

Global Income Tax Revenues 2026-2100 (% world GDP)




Interpretation. Global income tax revenues are projected to be high early on (around 4-5% of world GDP on average in 2026-2030) and to decline gradually (2-3% of world GDP in 2040-2060). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E4c)

Global Income Tax Revenues 2026-2100 (% regional GDP)




Interpretation. Global income tax revenues are projected to be high early on (around 4-5% of world GDP on average in 2026-2030) and to decline gradually (2-3% of world GDP in 2040-2060). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E4d)

High Incomes Matter More than Very High Incomes (Cumulated Income Tax Revenues 2026-2050, % World GDP)




Interpretation. Over the 2026-2050 period, cumulated income tax revenues represent 71.3% of world GDP, including 21.9% from brackets ranging from 7 to 20 average incomes (149k-426k € in 2026), 19.2% from brackets ranging from 20 to 100 average income (426k-2.1 million), 12.4% from brackets ranging from 100 to 1000 average income (2.1-21 million) and 17.8% from brackets over 1000 average income (21 million). **Sources & series:** gjp.wid.world (E4e)

High Incomes Matter More than Very High Incomes (Annual Global Income Tax Revenues 2026-2100, % world GDP)




Interpretation. The global Income tax is projected to raise annual revenues of about 3% of world GDP in period of 2026-2045, and about 0.5% of world GDP in the following years. The share of revenues from very high incomes (more than 1000x world average) decreases as income inequality declines. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (E4f)

Productivist Convergence Scenario: Same Productivity Trends as SC Scenario but No Labour Hour Reduction




Interpretation. In the "productivist convergence" scenario, we assume the same productivity trends as in "sustainable convergence" but with no reduction in labour hours, resulting in much larger per capita GDP levels (120k€ rather than 60k€). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F1a)

Persistent Inequality Scenario: Partial Productivity Convergence, No Labour Hour Reduction




Interpretation. In the "persistent inequality" scenario, we assume partial convergence in productivity levels (following patterns observed over the 1990-2025 period) and no reduction in labour hours, resulting in persistent inequality in per capita GDP. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F1b)

IMF Voting Rights 1945-2025: A GDP-Based Plutocratic System (Regional Share in IMF Voting Rights)



Interpretation. Europe and North America/Oceania have always had a majority of IMF voting rights (over 70% in the 1950s, and close to 55% in 2025). This can be explained by the dominant weight of financial variables (GDP, trade and financial openness) in the formula that allocates voting rights and the limited role of population-based "basic rights" (10% of votes in 1945, 5% in 2025). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F2a)

Declining US Voting Rights at IMF: Toward the End of the 15% Veto Power




Interpretation. IMF voting rights going to the US have declined markedly, from about 35% in 1945 to 17% in 2025, in line with the decline in the US share in world GDP. The US vote share is quickly declining and is now getting close to 15%. This threshold is important as it grants veto power for the Fund's most important decisions, in particular regarding the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR). US votes are closer to PPP GDP share than to MER share, due to a mixture of factors (PPP GDP used in formula since 2008; trade/openness effect; basic rights effect).

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (F2b)


The Slow Rise of an International Currency: SDR

Allocations 1970-2025 (Regional SDR Allocation, % of World GDP)




Interpretation. Total cumulated SDR allocations to countries – attributed in proportion to their IMF vote shares – have reached 0.6% of the world GDP in the early 2020s, following the large SDR creations which were decided after 2008 financial crisis and again after Covid crisis. This is beginning to represent a significant amount, and a lot more than when SDR were created in 1969-1970. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F3a)

The Slow Rise of an International Currency: SDR Allocations 1970-2025 (Regional SDR Allocation, % of World GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (F3b)

The Continuing Decline of the US, 1945-2100




Interpretation. According to our benchmark scenario, the US share in world GDP is set to decline from 15% in 2025 in PPP terms (23% in MER terms) to about 10% by 2050-2060 and around 5% by 2100, i.e. the same level as the country's population share. Under the alternative scenario (persistent inequality), US share in GDP is declining to less than 10% of world GDP by 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F4a)

The Continuing Decline of Europe, 1945-2100




Interpretation. According to our benchmark scenario, Europe's share in world GDP is set to decline from 17% in 2025 in PPP terms (22% in MER terms) to about 10% by 2050-2060 and around 5% by 2100, i.e. the same level as the country's population share. Under the alternative scenario (persistent inequality), Europe's share in GDP is declining to less than 10% of world GDP. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F4b)

The Rise and Decline of China, 1945-2100



Interpretation. China's share in world GDP is currently about 20% in PPP terms (17% in MER) and is scheduled to decline to 7% by 2100 according to our benchmark projections. China's population share is falling very fast, from 23% of world population in 1945 to about 17% in 2025 and about 7% in 2100. Under the alternative scenario (persistent inequality), China's share in world GDP is projected to decline to 12% by 2100. **Sources and series:** gdp.wid.world (F4c)


The Rise and Stabilization of India, 1945-2100



Interpretation. India's share in world GDP is currently about 8% in PPP terms (4% in MER) and is scheduled to increase to 16% by 2100 according to our benchmark projections, i.e. the same level as the country's population share. It is slightly higher in the alternative scenario (persistent inequality), due in particular to the persistent output gap with Sub-Saharan Africa. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F4d)

From Global Plutocracy to Global Democracy


(IMF Voting Rights 1945-2025 vs GJF Voting Rights 2050-2100)



Interpretation. The Global Justice Platform advocates for a democratic governance based upon a double majority system: regular budgetary decisions of the Global Justice Fund are adopted by 55% of the countries representing 60% of the world population. One could also imagine a gradual transition over the 2025-2050 period from the current IMF formula to a per-capita allocation of voting rights. However this gradual scenario involves a serious risk of getting bogged down and it would be better to shorten the transition. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F5a)


From Global Plutocracy to One Person-One Vote

(Voting Rights relative to Population Share)




Interpretation. In 2025, countries in Europe and North America/Oceania have 4x more votes at the IMF than their share in global population, while countries in South & SouthEast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have about 1/4 of their global population share in IMF voting rights. The Global Justice Platform envisions a transition from the current IMF formula to a per-capita allocation of voting rights, either immediately (the best solution in our view) and at the latest by 2050 (via a gradual transition). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (F5b)

Global Justice: Health and Education For All



Interpretation. Life expectancy rose from a world average of 26 years in 1800 to 73 years in 2025. For those living to age 1, it rose from 32 to 74 years (as infant mortality before age 1 dropped from 20% to less than 1%). Literacy rates for 15-year-olds-and-over rose from 12% to 86%. University enrolment for the 18-to-24-year-olds rose from less than 1% to 37%. The proportion of university graduates for the 25-year-olds-and-over rose from less than 1% to 17%. Under the Global Justice scenario, life expectancy could reach 85 years worldwide by 2100, while literacy rates, university enrollment rates & proportions of university graduates could reach 95% or more. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (G1a)


Global Justice: the Rise and Convergence of Education and Health Expenditure, 2026-2100



Interpretation. We project in our benchmark global justice scenario that total education and health expenditure should rise from 13% of world GDP in 2025 (with very large disparities, from 8% in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia to 23% in North America/Oceania) to about 30% of world GDP in 2050 and 38% in 2100. One of the core missions of the Global Justice Fund is to help finance this big push in education and health between 2026 and 2050. **Sources and series:** wid.world (G2a)

Towards Global Equality of Opportunities: Education


(Education Expenditure per Capita, 2025 Euros PPP)



Interpretation. In 2025, per capita expenditure in education varies from 209 Euros in Sub-Saharan Africa to 4141 Euros in North America/Oceania (all amounts in PPP 2025 Euros). Gaps are even larger if we look at per children expenditure. In the global justice scenario, all countries are projected to converge to 8400 Euros in per capita expenditure by 2100. **Sources & series:** gjp.wid.world (G3a)

The Long March for Equal Access to Education 2025-2100


Education Expenditure per Capita (2025 Euro PPP)



Interpretation. In the global justice scenario, per capita education expenditure is projected to converge to 8400€ (PPP 2025) in all countries by 2100. However, by 2050 the gap will still be very significant, with per capita education expenditure almost 3 times as large in North America/Oceania and Europe (close to 6000 Euros) than in Sub-Saharan Africa (around 2000 Euros). This is a large reduction of the gap as compared to 2025 (when the gap was about 1 to 20), but this is still a very substantial inequality of opportunity in access to education for the children born in the various world regions. Full equality of opportunity would require a larger Global Justice Fund. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (G3b)

Towards Global Equality of Opportunities: Health


(Health Expenditure per Capita, 2025 Euros PPP)



Interpretation. In 2025, per capita expenditure in health varies from 113 Euros in Sub-Saharan Africa to 8301 Euros in North America/Oceania (all amounts in PPP 2025 Euros), i.e. a gap of almost 1 to 80. By 2100, all countries are projected to converge to high-quality health for all, with per capita expenditure equal to 14400 Euros everywhere. **Sources & series:** gjp.wid.world (G3c)


The Long March for Equal Access to Health 2020-2100

Health Expenditure per Capita (2025 Euro PPP)




Interpretation. In the global justice scenario, per capita health expenditure is projected to converge to 14400€ (PPP 2025) in all countries by 2100. However, by 2050 the gap will still be very significant, with per capita health expenditure almost 3 times as large in North America/Oceania and Europe (about 10-12000 Euros) than in Sub-Saharan Africa (around 4000 Euros). This is a large reduction of the gap as compared to 2025 (when the gap was about 1 to 80), but this is still a very substantial inequality of opportunity in access to health for the inhabitants of the various regions. Full equality of opportunity would require a larger Global Justice Fund. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (G3d)

Global Justice: the Impact of Rising Education & Health Expenditure on Global Convergence



Interpretation. Rising human capital expenditure in the various regions over the 2026-2100 period can account for a large part of the productivity growth required for global convergence. According to our estimates, it can account for about 50-70% of projected productivity growth for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South & South-East Asia. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (G4a)


Global Justice: an Income Scale of 1 to 5 in All Countries



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the P99/P10 income ratio is scheduled to fall to 3.3 in all countries by 2100, and the ratio P99.9/P10 to 4.5, with a maximum income gap of 1 to 5.

Notes. P10 = percentile 10, P50 = percentile 50 (median), P99 = percentile 99. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H0a)


Global Justice: a Wealth Scale of 1 to 10 in All Countries



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the P99/P50 wealth ratio is scheduled to fall to 3.6 in all countries by 2100 and the ratio P99.9/P50 to 5.2, with a maximum wealth gap of 1 to 10

Notes. P10 = percentile 10, P50 = percentile 50 (median), P99 = percentile 99, etc. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H0b)


Global Justice: an Income Scale of 1 to 5 in All Countries, in Line with Historical Trend Toward Equality & Prosperity



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the P99/P10 income ratio is scheduled to fall to 3.3 in all countries by 2100, and the ratio P99.9/P10 to 4.5, with a maximum income gap of 1 to 5. The projected inequality compression for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared the compression which already took place in Nordic Europe over the 1910-1990 period (with P99/P10 ratio falling from 30.3 to 3.6).

Notes. P10 = percentile 10, P50 = percentile 50 (median), P99 = percentile 99, etc. Nordic Europe = average SE DK NO NL. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H1a)


Global Justice: a Wealth Scale of 1 to 10 in All Countries, in Line with Historical Trend Toward Equality & Prosperity



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the P99/P50 wealth ratio is scheduled to fall to 3.6 in all countries by 2100 and the ratio P99.9/P50 to 5.2, with a maximum wealth gap of 1 to 10. The projected inequality compression for the future is consistent with the compression which already took place in Nordic Europe, but requires the bottom 50% to rise to significant levels, possibly via universal minimal inheritance.

Notes. P10 = percentile 10, P50 = percentile 50 (median), P99 = percentile P99, etc. Nordic Europe = average SE DK NO NL. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H1b)


Global Justice: A Compression of the Income Scale in Line with Historical Trends (Ratio P99/P10)



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the income scale, expressed as the ratio between the post-tax income threshold of the 99th percentile and that of the 10th percentile, is projected to decline globally from 37 today (ratio of population-weighted country thresholds) to 3.3 by 2100. Such a compression of the income scale is similar in magnitude to historical developments observed in Nordic and Western Europe, where the P99/P10 ratio declined from 42 in 1900 to 7 in 1980 in Western Europe, and from 32 to 4 in Nordic Europe.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (H2a)

Global Justice: A Compression of the Income Scale in Line with Historical Trends (Ratio P99.9/P10)




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the income scale, expressed as the ratio between the post-tax income threshold of the 99.9th percentile and that of the 10th percentile, is projected to decline globally from 130 today (ratio of population-weighted country thresholds) to 4.5 by 2100. Such a compression of the income scale is similar in magnitude to historical developments observed in Nordic and Western Europe, where the P99/P10 ratio declined from 200 in 1900 to 20 in 1980 in Western Europe, and from 150 to 11 in Nordic Europe. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H2b)

P99 / P10 Ratio of Post Tax Income




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (H2c)

P99.9 / P10 Ratio of Post Tax Income




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (H2d)

Inequality Compression in Rich Countries (P90 / P10)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (H2e)


High Inequality Is Not Necessary for Prosperity (Income Ratio P99.9/P10, 1900-2025)



Interpretation. The income scale, expressed as the ratio of the income thresholds P99.9 and P10, has gone through an enormous compression in Nordic Europe (from 150 in 1900 to 11 in 1990 and 17 in 2025) & Western Europe (from 190 in 1900 to 20 in 1980 and 29 in 2025) during the 20th century. This did not prevent productivity - as measured by hourly GDP - to rise to unprecedented levels over the same period.

Note: Western Europe: DE-FR-GB. Nordic Europe: SE-DK-NO-NL. World: ratio of population-weighted country thresholds. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H3a)


High Inequality Is Not Necessary for Prosperity (Hourly GDP, 1900-2025)



Interpretation. The income scale, expressed as the ratio of the income thresholds P99.9 and P10, has gone through an enormous compression in Nordic Europe (from 150 in 1900 to 11 in 1990 and 17 in 2025) & Western Europe (from 190 in 1900 to 20 in 1980 and 29 in 2025) during the 20th century. This did not prevent productivity - as measured by hourly GDP - to rise to unprecedented levels over the same period.


Note: Western Europe: DE-FR-GB. Nordic Europe: SE-DK-NO-NL. World: ratio of population-weighted country thresholds. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (H3b)

Inequality Compression (Ratio P99.9 / P10)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (H3c)

Rise in Productivity (Hourly GDP)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (H3d)

Income Shares in Nordic Europe 2026-2100: Pursuing The Great Redistribution of the 20th Century




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest incomes in total posttax income is projected to pursue its historical fall in the 21st century, from 52% in 1910 to 24% in 2025 and 18% by 2100. Similarly, the bottom 50% share is projected to rise from 17% in 1910 to 33% in 2025 and 38% in 2100. The projected inequality compression for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared to the compression which already took place over the 1910-1990 period. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (10a)

Income Shares in Western Europe 2026-2100: Pursuing The Great Redistribution of the 20th Century




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest incomes in total posttax income is projected to pursue its historical fall in the 21st century, from 52% in 1910 to 26% in 2025 and 18% by 2100. Similarly, the bottom 50% share is projected to rise from 16% in 1910 to 31% in 2025 and 38% in 2100. The projected inequality compression for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared to the compression which already took place over the 1910-1990 period. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (10b)

Global Income Shares 2026-2100: Combining Between-Country Equality & Within-Country Inequality Compression




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest incomes in total posttax income in the world is projected to decline from 52% in 2025 to 18% in 2100. The share of the global bottom 50% in posttax income is projected to increase from 8% in 2025 to 38% in 2100, and for the middle 40% from 40% today to 44% in 2100. These changes are a combined effect of between-country income convergence and within-country income compression. **Sources and series:** wid.world (l0c)

Global Justice 2026-2100: Pursuing and Extending the Long-Run Fall of the Top 10% Income Share




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest incomes in total posttax income is projected to pursue its historical fall in the future, from 52% in 1910 in Nordic & Western Europe to 23-26% in 2025 and 18% by 2100. The projected inequality compression for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared to the compression which already took place over the 1910-1990 period in the case of Europe, but would represent a significant acceleration for the US and the world. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1a)

Global Justice: Pursuing the Long-Run Rise of Bottom 50%




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the bottom 50% lowest incomes in total posttax income is projected to pursue its historical rise in the future, from 16% in 1910 in Nordic & Western Europe to 33-34% in 2025 and 38% by 2100. The projected rise for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared to the historical rise which already took place in the case of Europe, but would represent a significant acceleration for the US and the rest of the world. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1b)

Global Justice: Pursuing the Long-Run Fall of the Top 1%




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 1% highest incomes in total posttax income is projected to pursue its historical fall in the future, from 24-25% in 1910 in Nordic & Western Europe to 6-8% in 2025 and 3% by 2100. The projected inequality compression for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared to the historical compression which already took place period in the case of Europe, but would represent a significant acceleration for the US and the world. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1c)

Global Justice: Pursuing the Long-Run Fall of the Top 0.1%



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.1% highest incomes in total posttax income is projected to pursue its historical fall in the future, from 11-12% in 1910 in Nordic & Western Europe to 2-3% in 2025 and less than 1% by 2100. The projected inequality compression for the 21st century is relatively modest as compared to the historical compression which already took place period in the case of Europe, but would represent a significant acceleration for the US and the world. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1d)


Global Justice Platform: The Global Income Tax and the Fall of the Top 0.1%



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (l1e)


The Rise of the Bottom 50%

(World Bottom 50% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100)




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the bottom 50% lowest incomes in global posttax income is projected to increase from 8% in 2025 to 38% in 2100. Thanks to global socioeconomic convergence, each country and region becomes represented according to its population share. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1h)

World Top 10% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest incomes in global posttax income is projected to decline from 51% in 2025 to 18% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (11i)

World Middle 40% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the middle 40% in global posttax income, including everyone between the bottom 50% and the top 10%, is projected to increase from 51% in 2025 to 18% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1j)

World Top 1% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 1% highest incomes in global posttax income is projected to decrease from 19% in 2025 to 2.6% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1k)


World Top 0.1% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.1% highest incomes in global posttax income is projected to decrease from 8% in 2025 to 0.3% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (I1I)


The Rise and Fall of the Global Rich

(World Top 0.01% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100)




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.01% highest incomes in global posttax income is projected to decrease from 4% in 2025 to 0.03% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1m)

World Top 0.001% Posttax Income Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.001% highest incomes in global posttax income is projected to decrease from 2% in 2025 to 0.003% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l1n)

Average Post-tax Income by Global Income Group




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I2a)

Average Post-tax Income by Global Income Group




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I2b)

Europe: Average Post-tax Income by Income Group




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I2c)

US: Average Post-tax Income by Income Group




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I2d)

Subsaharan Africa: Average Post-tax Income by Income Group




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I2e)

East Asia: Average Post-tax Income by Income Group




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I2f)

Projected Posttax Income of Bottom 50%, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average per capita posttax net income of the bottom 50% is increasing in all regions and converging to 38 000 Euros in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (I3a)

Projected Posttax Median Income, 2026-2100



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the median per capita posttax net income (P50) is increasing in all regions and converging to 45 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (I3b)


Projected Posttax Income of Middle 40%, 2026-2100



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average posttax income for the middle 40%, including those with higher income than the median but below the top 10%, is increasing in all regions and converging to 56 000 Euro in 2100.


Sources and series: wid.world (l3c)

Projected Posttax Income of Top 10%, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average posttax income of the top 10% highest incomes is increasing for most regions and converging to 92 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (I3d)

Projected Posttax Income of Top 1%, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average posttax income of the top 1% highest incomes is decreasing for most regions and converging to 130,000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (l3e)

Projected Posttax Income of the Top 0.1%, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average posttax income of the top 0.1% highest incomes is decreasing in all regions and converging to 160 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (I3f)

Projected Posttax Income of Top 0.01%, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average posttax income of the top 0.01% highest incomes is decreasing in all regions and converging to 161 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (l3g)

Projected Posttax Income of Top 0.001%, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average posttax income of the top 0.001% highest incomes is decreasing in all regions and converging to 164,000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** wid.world (I3h)

Inequality Compression in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (l4a)

Global Justice: Pursuing the Long-Run Rise of Equality




Top-End Inequality Compression in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (l4c)

Very Top-End Inequality Compression in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (l4d)

Pursuing the Long-Run Fall of Posttax Gini Coefficients



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (l4e)


The Aggregate Size of the Capital Income Correction (% of NNI)



Interpretation: We correct the income distribution series to ensure that capital shares are always equal or smaller than one for all percentiles (a simple internal consistency check which can fail when very top income levels are insufficiently high as compared to very top wealth levels for some countries-years). This figures shows the amount of income redistributed between percentiles to ensure capital shares are smaller than 1. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (15)

Posttax Income Share of the Top 1% (% of NNI)


The effect of the Capital Income Correction



Interpretation: The dashed lines show the posttax income shares of the top 1% before we adjusting income shares in order to have capital shares smaller than one for all percentiles. At the world level, the top 1% share rises from 18.2% to 18.8% after the capital income correction in 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (l5a)

Posttax Income Share of the Top 0.1% (% of NNI)

The effect of the Capital Income Correction




Interpretation: The dashed lines show the posttax income shares of the top 0.1% before we adjusting income shares in order to have capital shares smaller than one for all percentiles.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I5b)

Posttax Income Share of the Top 0.01% (% of NNI)

The effect of the Capital Income Correction




Interpretation: The dashed lines show the posttax income shares of the top 0.01% before we adjusting income shares in order to have capital shares smaller than one for all percentiles.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (I5c)

Posttax Income Share of the Top 0.001% (% of NNI)


The effect of the Capital Income Correction



Interpretation: The dashed lines show the posttax income shares of the top 0.001% before we adjusting income shares in order to have capital shares smaller than one for all percentiles.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (l5d)

The Decline of Pre- and Post- Tax Inequality 1900-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest incomes will decrease to 18% in 2100. In our benchmark scenario, this decline is largely driven by a compression of pretax income inequality. Historically, episodes with a large decline in post-tax income inequality were driven by declining pretax income inequality. In Nordic and Western Europe, the post-tax income share of the top 10% decreased from 52% in 1900 to 23% in 1980 in the case of Western Europe and to 20% in the case of Nordic Europe. In both cases, the decline was largely driven by a decline in pretax inequality and not purely by redistributive measures. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (J0a)

The Rise of the Bottom 50% Income Share, 1900-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the bottom 50% smallest incomes will increase to 38% in 2100. In our benchmark scenario, this is largely driven by a compression of pretax income inequality. Historically, episodes with a large decline in post-tax income inequality were driven by declining pretax income inequality. In Nordic and Western Europe, the post-tax income share of the bottom 50% increased from 16% in 1900 to 30% in 1980 in the case of Western Europe and to 36% in the case of Nordic Europe. In both cases, the increase was largely driven by a decline in pretax inequality and not purely by redistributive measures. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (J0b)

Nordic Europe: Inequality Compression in Pre- and Post- Tax Income 1900-2100




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (J0c)

Western Europe: Inequality Compression in Pre- and Post- Tax Income 1900-2100




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (J0d)

Wealth Shares in Nordic Europe 2026-2100: Pursuing the Redistribution of the 20th Century




Interpretation. In Nordic Europe (which we define as the average Sweden-Denmark-Norway-Netherlands), the share of the top 10% highest wealth holders in total household wealth (including housing, business and financial assets, net of debt) fell from over 80% in 1910 to about 50-55% since 1980-1990, with a moderate rise in recent decades. The long-run fall of the top 10% share benefited mostly to the next 40% (the "patrimonial middle class") and very little to the bottom 50%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K0a)

Wealth Shares in Western Europe 2026-2100: Pursuing The Great Redistribution of the 20th Century




Interpretation. In Western Europe (average Germany-France-Britain), the share of the top 10% highest wealth holders in total household wealth (including housing, business and financial assets, net of debt) fell from over 80% in 1910 to about 50-60% since 1980-1990, with a moderate rise in recent decades. According to the Global Justice Platform, the top 10% wealth share should fall to about 25% by 2100, to the benefit of the next 40% (the "patrimonial middle class") and especially of the bottom 50%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K0b)

Global Wealth Shares 2026-2100: Combining Between-Country Equality & Within-Country Inequality Compression




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest wealth holders in total household wealth in the world is projected to decline from 76% in 2025 to 25% in 2100. The share of the global bottom 50% household wealth is projected to increase from 2% in 2025 to 30% in 2100, and for the middle 40% from 23% in 2025 to 44% in 2100. These changes are a combined effect of between-country wealth convergence and within-country wealth compression. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K0c)

The Top 10% in Rich Countries in the Long-Run




Interpretation. We observe in all rich countries a significant fall of the top 10% wealth share between 1910 and 1980. In the USA, the fall was less massive than in Western Europe or Nordic Europe, and was partly undone by rising wealth concentration since 1980-1990
Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1a)

The Bottom 50% in Rich Countries in the Long-Run




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1b)

The Top 1% in Rich Countries in the Long-Run




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1c)

The Top 0.1% in Rich Countries in the Long-Run




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1d)

Top 0.01% Wealth Shares 1800-2025




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1e)

The Rise of the Bottom 50% (World Bottom 50% Wealth Share 1800-2100)




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the bottom 50% wealth holders in total personal wealth is projected to increase from 2% in 2025 to 30% in 2100. The country composition in 2100 follows the regional shares in global population in 2100 because average wealth and wealth distributions equalize between countries. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1f)

World Top 10% Wealth Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 10% highest wealth holders in total personal wealth is projected to decrease from 75% today to 35% in 2100. The country composition in 2100 follows the regional shares in global population in 2100 because average wealth and wealth distributions equalize between countries. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1g)

World Middle 40% Wealth Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the middle 40% in personal wealth, those with higher wealth than the median but below the top 10%, are projected to increase their share in personal wealth from 22% in 2025 to 44% in 2100. The country composition in 2100 follows the regional shares in global population in 2100 because average wealth and wealth distributions equalize between countries. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1h)

World Top 1% Wealth Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 1% highest wealth holders in total personal wealth is projected to decrease from 38% today to 5% in 2100. The country composition in 2100 follows the regional shares in global population in 2100 because average wealth and wealth distributions equalize between countries. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1i)

World Top 0.1% Wealth Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.1% highest wealth holders in total personal wealth is projected to decrease from 20% today to 0.6% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1j)

World Top 0.01% Wealth Share 1800-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.01% highest wealth holders in total personal wealth is projected to decrease from 11.2% today to 0.1% in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1k)

The Rise and Fall of the Billionaire Class (World Top 0.001% Wealth Share 1800-2100)




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the share of the top 0.001% highest wealth holders in total personal wealth is projected to decrease from 6.4% in 2025 to 0.05% in 2100. In 2025, the group of the top 0.001% corresponds approximately to the group of billionaires (about 80 thousand individuals with average per capita wealth around 500 million Euros). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K1l)

Wealth Gini Coefficients in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1m)

Wealth Gini Coefficients by Region 1800-2025




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K1n)

Projected Bottom 50% Personal Wealth, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average per capita personal wealth of the bottom 50% is increasing in all regions and converging to 140 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2a)

Projected Middle 40% Personal Wealth, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average personal wealth of the next 40% is increasing in all regions and converging to about 260 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2b)

Projected Top 10% Personal Wealth, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average personal wealth of the top 10% of highest wealth holders is converging to 600 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2c)

Projected Top 1% Personal Wealth, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average personal wealth of the top 1% of highest wealth holders is converging to 1 000 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2d)

Projected Top 0.1% Personal Wealth, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average personal wealth of the top 0.1% of highest wealth holders is converging to 1 400 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2e)

Projected Top 0.01% Personal Wealth, 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average personal wealth of the top 0.01% of highest wealth holders is converging to 1 500 000 Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2f)

Projected Top 0.001% Personal Wealth 2026-2100




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the average personal wealth of the top 0.001% of highest wealth holders is converging to 2.2 Million Euro in 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (K2g)

Wealth Inequality Compression in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K3a)

The Rise of Wealth Equality in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K3b)

Top-End Wealth Inequality Compression in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K3c)

Top-End Wealth Inequality Compression in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K3d)

The Fall of the P99/P50 Wealth Ratio in Rich Countries




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K4a)

The Fall of the P99.9/P50 Wealth Ratio in Rich Countries



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (K4b)


Equality After the Elephant: Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence



Interpretation. Between 1980 and 2025, global income growth was highly unequally distributed. The top 0.001% had an average growth rate of 4%, while the bottom half experienced annual growth rates of about 2.5%. The lowest income growth was located in the 70th to 90th global income percentiles, which represent the middle class in rich countries. This pattern is also known as the elephant curve. According to the Global Justice Platform, annual income growth is projected to reach 5% at the bottom and -7% at the very top between 2025 and 2100.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O1a)


The Elephant Curve: Unequal Gains of Global Income Growth (Cumulative Growth by Global Income Group, 1980-2025)



Interpretation. During the last 45 years global income growth was highly unequally distributed. The top 0.001% had an average growth rate of posttax income of 4%, while the bottom half experienced annual average posttax income growth rates of about 2.5%. The lowest income growth over the last 45 years was located in the 70th to 90th global income percentiles, which represent the middle class in rich countries. This pattern is also known as the elephant curve. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O1b)


Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence

(Cumulative Growth by Global Income Group, 2025-2100)




Interpretation. The fraction of the population with negative income growth over the 2025-2100 period is projected to be about 2% of the world level, with large regional variations (up to 10-15% of losers in Europe and North America/Oceania and less the 0.1% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O1c)

Global Justice: Large Majorities Benefit from Higher Monetary Income In All Regions, but with Variations




Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, large majorities of the population in every region benefit from rising monetary income between 2025 and 2100. At the world level, 89% of the population double their income or more, 7% increase their income between 20% and 100%, 2% by 0-20% and 2% face an income decline. However the fraction of the population declining income rises to significantly higher levels in the richest regions (6% in Europe and 14% in North America/Oceania). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O2a)

Global Justice: Large Majorities Benefit from Much Higher Augmented Income (incl. value of leisure) In All Countries




Interpretation. If we include plausible lower-bound estimates for the valuation of free time (leisure), we find that over 99% of the population in all regions benefit from very large rise in “augmented income” between 2025 and 2100. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O2b)

Population Share with Rising Monetary Income (As Compared to 2025)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O2c)

Population Share with Rising Augmented Income (As Compared to 2025)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O2d)

Share of Population with Higher Income Compared to 2025 level




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O2e)

Share of Population with Higher Augmented Income (incl. value of leisure) Compared to 2025 Level



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O2f)


Population Shares by Monetary Income Differential Between SC and PI Scenarios in 2100



Interpretation. According to our projections, 42% of the world population has lower monetary income in 2100 under sustainable convergence (SC) as compared to persistent inequality (PI) scenario. This fraction is as large as 88-96% in the world's richest regions.


Note. Under SC scenario, all countries converge to 60k Euros (PPP 2025) in per capita GDP by 2100. Under PI scenario, there are persistent gaps between countries, from 28k in Subsaharan Africa to 203k in North America/Oceania. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O3a)

Population Shares by Augmented Income Differential Between SC and PI Scenarios in 2100




Interpretation. According to our projections, 5% of the world population has lower augmented income (incl. valuation for leisure and climate) in 2100 under sustainable convergence (SC) as compared to persistent inequality (PI) scenario. This fraction rises to 12-17% in the world's richest regions. **Note.** Under SC scenario, all countries converge to 60k Euros (PPP 2025) in per capita GDP by 2100. Under PI scenario, there are persistent gaps between countries, from 28k in Subsaharan Africa to 203k in North America/Oceania. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O3b)

Global Justice: Large Majorities Benefit from Higher Augmented Income in 2100 Compared to PI Scenario




Interpretation. The fraction of world population benefiting from sustainable convergence (SC) relative to persistent inequality (PI) scenario jumps from 58% to 95% once we include the value of leisure and climates. This fraction jumps from 4% to 83% in Europe and from 13% to 89% in North America/Oceania. **Note.** Under SC scenario, all countries converge to 60k Euros (PPP 2025) in per capita GDP by 2100. Under PI scenario, there are persistent gaps between countries, from 28k in Subsaharan Africa to 203k in North America/Oceania. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O3c)

Share of Population with Higher Monetary Income (SC vs PI)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O3d)

Population Share with Higher Augmented Income (SC vs PI)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O3e)

Population Share with Higher Augmented Income (SC vs PI Scenarios)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O3f)

Population Shares by Monetary Income Differential Between SC and PC Scenarios in 2100




Interpretation. According to our projections, 61% of the world population has lower monetary income in 2100 under sustainable convergence (SC) as compared to persistent inequality (PI) scenario. This fraction is as large as 79-90% in the world's richest regions.

Note. Under SC scenario, all countries converge to 60k Euros (PPP 2025) in per capita GDP by 2100. Under PC scenario, all countries converge to 120k Euros.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O4a)

Population Shares by Augmented Income Differential Between SC and PC Scenarios in 2100




Interpretation. According to our projections, 5% of the world population has lower augmented income (incl. valuation for leisure and climate) in 2100 under productivist convergence (PC) as compared to persistent inequality (PI) scenario. This fraction equals 2-3% in the world's richest regions. **Note.** Under SC scenario, all countries converge to 60k Euros (PPP 2025) in per capita GDP by 2100. Under PC scenario, all countries converge to 120k Euros. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O4b)

Share of Population With Higher Income in 2100 compared to a Scenario of Productivist Convergence




Interpretation. The fraction of world population benefiting from sustainable convergence (SC) relative to productivist convergence (PC) scenario jumps from 40% to 96% once we include the value of leisure and climates. This fraction jumps from 10% to 98% in Europe and from 22% to 99% in North America/Oceania. **Note.** Under SC scenario, all countries converge to 60k Euros (PPP 2025) in per capita GDP by 2100. Under PC scenario, all countries converge to 120k Euros. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (O4c)

Population Share with Higher Monetary Income (SC vs PC)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O4d)

Population Share with Higher Augmented Income (SC vs PC)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O4e)

Population Share with Higher Augmented Income (SC vs PC)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O4f)


Global Justice: Large Majorities Benefit from Higher Wealth In All Regions, but with Variations



Interpretation. According to the Global Justice Platform, the majority of the population in every region experiences a large increase in their personal wealth comparing 2100 and 2025. 85% of the world population double their wealth. 3% increase their wealth between 20% and 100%, 1% increase their wealth by 0-20% and 11% have a decline in their personal wealth. Because wealth is more unequally distributed than income we see a larger fraction of losers in all regions. Note that the decline in personal wealth is partly due to the increase in public wealth.

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O5a)


Global Justice: Large Majorities Benefit from Higher Augmented Wealth In All Countries, but with Variations



Interpretation. "Augmented Wealth" includes personal wealth and per-capita public wealth. We observe even larger increases in augmented wealth compared to personal wealth because the Global Justice Platform includes an increase in the share of public wealth.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O5b)

Population Share with Higher Personal Wealth compared to 2025




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O5c)

Population Share with higher Personal Wealth Compared to 2025




Population Share with higher Augmented Wealth (private + public wealth) compared to 2025 level




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O5e)

Income Growth Rates under an Alternative Target Distribution (Income Scale Parameter k=2)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O6a)

Income Growth Rates under an Alternative Target Distribution (Income Scale Parameter k=50)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (O6b)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=1)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1a)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=2)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1b)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=3)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1c)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=4)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1d)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=5)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1e)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=8)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1f)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=10)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1g)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=15)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1h)

Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=50)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1i)

Europe: Annual Income Growth Rates for Global Convergence under Alternative Target Distributions (k=50)




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (P1j)

The Flattening of Relative Synthetic Saving Rates




Interpretation. Relative synthetic saving rates show the percentile-level synthetic saving rate as a fraction of the national average saving rate. High-income groups have a higher saving rate than poorer households. In our simulation we gradually move from the observed saving rate profile in 2025 to the target relative saving rates in 2100. The main mechanism for the flattening of the profile is the compression of the income scale. It can also be affected by policies (e.g. redistribution of inheritance). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (S1a)

Relative Gross Synthetic Saving Rates




Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (S1b)

The Flattening of the Gross Capital Income Share




Interpretation. The capital share is increasing with higher incomes due to wealth-income ratios for top income groups. The capital share by g-percentile is computed based on personal wealth assuming constant returns to wealth across all income groups. Empirically, richer people tend to have higher returns which leads to an even steeper profile for the capital share. The flattening of the capital share profile over time is due to the massive compression of the wealth scale. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (S2a)

The Flattening of the Wealth-Income Ratio



Interpretation. The personal wealth-to-income ratio is a rising function of the income percentile. The flattening of the personal wealth-to-income ratio is due to the massive reduction in wealth inequality. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (S2b)


Cumulated Colonial and Climate Damages 1800-2025 (% World GDP 2025)



Interpretation. Cumulated colonial and climate damages between 1800 and 2025 are estimated to be around 240% of world GDP in 2025, including 110% for the damages induced by slavery (unpaid wages and mistreatments), 70% for other colonial damages (transfers and war tributes imposed by Britain to India, the Netherlands to Indonesia, France to Haïti, etc.) and 60% for climate damages (computed as income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries - those whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceeded 60% of the world average - converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025).

Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (T0a)


Global Justice Fund North-South Transfers Are Smaller Than Colonial and Climate Damages (Annual Transfers 2026-2100, % World GDP)



Interpretation. The North-South transfers induced by the Global Justice Fund (i.e. the extra wealth and income taxes paid and lower country dividends received by Europe and North America/Oceania) represent about 0.8% of world GDP on average between 2026 and 2100. This is significantly smaller than the corresponding annual transfers which should have been paid over the same period in order to compensate for the cumulated colonial and climate damages imposed by Europe and North America/Oceania between 1800 and 2025.


Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (T0b)

Aggregate Historical Climate Damage as a Share of 2025 Regional GDP (k=50%)




Interpretation. Bars show cumulative climate damages accrued by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 50% of the world average, expressed as a share of 2025 regional GDP. Damages reflect income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold) converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025. Regions composed by high-emitter countries show 0%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T1a)

Aggregate Historical Climate Damage as a Share of 2025 Regional GDP (k=60%)




Interpretation. Bars show cumulative climate damages accrued by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 60% of the world average, expressed as a share of 2025 regional GDP. Damages reflect income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold) converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025. Regions composed by high-emitter countries show 0%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T1b)

Aggregate Historical Climate Damage as a Share of 2025 Regional GDP (k=80%)




Interpretation. Bars show cumulative climate damages accrued by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 80% of the world average, expressed as a share of 2025 regional GDP. Damages reflect income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold) converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025. Regions composed by high-emitter countries show 0%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T1c)

Aggregate Historical Climate Damage as a Share of 2025 Regional GDP (k=100%)




Interpretation. Bars show cumulative climate damages accrued by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 100% of the world average, expressed as a share of 2025 regional GDP. Damages reflect income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold) converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025. Regions composed by high-emitter countries show 0%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T1d)

Aggregate Historical Climate Damage as a Share of 2025 Regional GDP (k=120%)




Interpretation. Bars show cumulative climate damages accrued by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 120% of the world average, expressed as a share of 2025 regional GDP. Damages reflect income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold) converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025. Regions composed by high-emitter countries show 0%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T1e)

Aggregate Historical Climate Damage as a Share of 2025 Regional GDP (k=150%)




Interpretation. Bars show cumulative climate damages accrued by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 150% of the world average, expressed as a share of 2025 regional GDP. Damages reflect income and welfare losses from the excess warming that would have been avoided had high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold) converged to world per-capita average emissions between 1970 and 2025. Regions composed by high-emitter countries show 0%. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T1f)

Share of Regional Population Living in Damaged Countries (k=50%)




Interpretation. Bars show the regional shares of the 2025 population living in countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 50% of the world average. The smaller the value, the more regions are composed of high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T2a)

Share of Regional Population Living in Damaged Countries (k=60%)




Interpretation. Bars show the regional shares of the 2025 population living in countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 60% of the world average. The smaller the value, the more regions are composed of high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T2b)

Share of Regional Population Living in Damaged Countries (k=80%)




Interpretation. Bars show the regional shares of the 2025 population living in countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 80% of the world average. The smaller the value, the more regions are composed of high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T2c)

Share of Regional Population Living in Damaged Countries (k=100%)




Interpretation. Bars show the regional shares of the 2025 population living in countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 100% of the world average. The smaller the value, the more regions are composed of high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T2d)

Share of Regional Population Living in Damaged Countries (k=120%)




Interpretation. Bars show the regional shares of the 2025 population living in countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 120% of the world average. The smaller the value, the more regions are composed of high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T2e)

Share of Regional Population Living in Damaged Countries (k=150%)




Interpretation. Bars show the regional shares of the 2025 population living in countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 fall below 150% of the world average. The smaller the value, the more regions are composed of high-emitter countries (those exceeding the threshold). **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T2f)

Share of Cumulated Emissions in 1850-2024 Above Threshold (k=50%)




Interpretation. Bars show each region's share of cumulative "excess" emissions between 1850 and 2024. Excess emissions are those emitted by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceed 50% of the world average; i.e., what would have been avoided had those countries converged to the world per-capita average between 1970 and 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T3a)

Share of Cumulated Emissions in 1850-2024 Above Threshold (k=60%)




Interpretation. Bars show each region's share of cumulative "excess" emissions between 1850 and 2024. Excess emissions are those emitted by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceed 60% of the world average; i.e., what would have been avoided had those countries converged to the world per-capita average between 1970 and 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T3b)

Share of Cumulated Emissions in 1850-2024 Above Threshold ($k=80\%$)




Interpretation. Bars show each region's share of cumulative "excess" emissions between 1850 and 2024. Excess emissions are those emitted by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceed 80% of the world average; i.e., what would have been avoided had those countries converged to the world per-capita average between 1970 and 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T3c)

Share of Cumulated Emissions in 1850-2024 Above Threshold (k=100%)




Interpretation. Bars show each region's share of cumulative "excess" emissions between 1850 and 2024. Excess emissions are those emitted by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceed 100% of the world average; i.e., what would have been avoided had those countries converged to the world per-capita average between 1970 and 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T3d)

Share of Cumulated Emissions in 1850-2024 Above Threshold (k=120%)




Interpretation. Bars show each region's share of cumulative "excess" emissions between 1850 and 2024. Excess emissions are those emitted by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceed 150% of the world average; i.e., what would have been avoided had those countries converged to the world per-capita average between 1970 and 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T3e)

Share of Cumulated Emissions in 1850-2024 Above Threshold (k=150%)




Interpretation. Bars show each region's share of cumulative "excess" emissions between 1850 and 2024. Excess emissions are those emitted by countries whose historical per-capita emissions since 1850 exceed 150% of the world average; i.e., what would have been avoided had those countries converged to the world per-capita average between 1970 and 2025. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (T3f)

The Global Justice Platform without the US: Climate Impact and Corrective Tax




Interpretation. The figure shows the climate and economic consequences of US non-participation in the Global Justice Platform, assuming all other countries comply. US defection raises global warming by 2100 from 1.8°C to 2.0°C. The additional warming inflicts annual damages of 3.0% of GDP on the rest of the world (income and welfare losses, 2026–2100). A corrective tariff of 77% on US exports would fully compensate affected countries for these damages. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (U1)

The Global Justice Platform without China: Climate Impact and Corrective Tax



Interpretation. The figure shows the climate and economic consequences of non-participation of China in the Global Justice Platform, assuming all other countries comply. The defection of China raises global warming by 2100 from 1.8°C to 2.3°C. The additional warming inflicts annual damages of 8.1% of GDP on the rest of the world (income and welfare losses, 2026–2100). A corrective tariff of 182% on Chinese exports would fully compensate affected countries for these damages. **Sources and series:** gjp.wid.world (U2)

Profile of Gross Capital Shares by Region (2025)



Sources and series: gjp.wid.world (S3)